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This paper is about whether consciousness flows. Evan Thompson (2014) has recently 
claimed that the study of binocular rivalry shows that there are some moments where 
consciousness does not flow, contra William James (1890). Moreover, he’s claimed that 
Abhidharma philosophers reject James’s claim that consciousness flows. I argue that 
binocular rivalry poses no special challenge to James. Second, I argue that because 
Thompson did not take up the question of how James and Abhidharma philosophers analyse 
or define flow, he under-described their disagreement in a way that obscures an important 
conceptual contribution that Abhidharma philosophers make to the study of flow. They 
reject James’s claim that there are only two conceivable ways for consciousness to fail to 
flow, and suggest that there is a third way for consciousness to fail to flow – a way that 








This paper is about how William James characterizes conscious flow and how his 
account can help us move forward on recent philosophical debates in scientifically informed 
philosophy of mind and cross-cultural philosophy of mind.  Evan Thompson (2014) has 
recently claimed that the study of binocular rivalry shows us that there are at least some 
moments in our lives where consciousness does not actually flow, despite the appearances. 
Moreover, he’s claimed that Abhidharma philosophers reject James’s claim that 
consciousness flows (2014 p. 34-40).2  
I use my reading of James on conscious flow to reject Thompson’s first claim. I also 
argue that because Thompson did not take up the question of how James and Abhidharma 
philosophers analyse or define flow, he under-described their reasons for disagreement, 
thereby obscuring an important conceptual contribution that Abhidharma philosophy 
makes to the study of flow.   According to James, what it usually is for consciousness to flow 
is for the phenomenology of any two immediately sequential moments of consciousness to 
overlap to at least some small degree. Sometimes, James also thinks that flow can obtain 
across gaps of unconsciousness through conscious states on either side of the gap feeling like 
they belong to the same self. This is an understanding of conscious flow which is compatible 
with all the experiences that occur during binocular rivalry and compatible with all the 
neuroscientific facts revealed by research into binocular rivalry. 
 
1 Thanks to two anonymous referees from The Journal of the American Philosophical Association for their very 
helpful comments on a previous version of this paper.  
2 Dunne 2016 has raised the worry, in a review of Thompson that “the Abhidharma” is a broad enough term 
that it may obscure important differences between various texts and philosophers in that tradition. As we’ll see 
later, my own arguments in this paper rely on a few phenomenological observations that come from one 
particular text rather than the Abhidharma in general: Buddhaghosa’s Visuddhimagga.  
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Secondly, Thompson under-describes the reasons for disagreement between James 
and Abhidharma philosophers. To simplify the discussion, in this paper I will focus on the 
disagreement as it occurs between James and Buddhaghosa. What we can find in 
Buddhaghosa’s work is not simply the rejection of the claim that consciousness flows, but 
even more interestingly, a rejection of a claim James makes along the way to formulating his  
thesis about flow - his claim that there are only two conceivable ways for consciousness to 
fail to flow. The view in Buddhaghosa’s work is that there is a third conceivable way for 
consciousness to fail to flow: through feeling as though it passes out of existence during every 
moment of consciousness.   
So Buddhaghosa’s work does support the contention that consciousness doesn’t flow. 
But missing out on the precise sense in which he disagrees with James obscures the radical 
nature of the contribution that he makes to the debate about conscious flow. To someone 
with James’s theoretical presuppositions, Buddhaghosa’s contribution expands logical space 
rather than simply makes the case for a position within logical space. Giving a right account 
of their disagreement requires going deeper than Thompson’s discussion of this issue, and 
engaging more with the question of what “flow” in the stream of consciousness really means.  
Empirically informed and cross-cultural conversations are both deeply important 
parts of the philosophy of mind. But these conversations require constant, careful checks 
into whether we have correctly interpreted all the participants involved. While this paper 
makes some critical points, this is simply a means to achieving a goal I share with Thompson: 
ensuring that these conversations flourish.  
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2. James on Conscious Flow 
In “The Stream of Thought” in Principles of Psychology, James begins with arguing that 
psychology’s foundational first data point is that “thought goes on”, and then defend defends 
several more specific theses about what that thought, or consciousness, is like (James 1890 
p. 224). One of his first goals is to argue that consciousness is “sensibly continuous” (James 
1890 p. 226). By “continuous”, James says that he means “that which is without breach, crack, 
or division” (James 1890 p. 237). What it is for consciousness to be sensibly continuous is for 
consciousness to feel as though it is without breach, crack, or division. 
 
He uses the “stream of consciousness” metaphor to capture all these ideas. This is 
what that metaphor looks like: “[consciousness], then, does not appear to itself chopped up 
in bits. Such words as 'chain' or 'train' do not describe it fitly as it presents itself in the first 
instance. It is nothing jointed; if flows. A 'river' or a 'stream' are the metaphors by which it is 
most naturally described” (James 1890 p. 239.) As we can see, this is where James introduces 
the language of “flow” rather than “sensibly continuity”. They mean the same thing for him, 
but “flow” has simply become a more popular term to express these ideas in recent years.  
 James’s metaphor has been very widely taken up in philosophy and psychology. 
Many of us seem to agree with James that there is just something right about the idea that 
our conscious lives do not appear “chopped up in bits”, and that our moments of conscious 
experience to seem to smoothly flow into each other, from one moment to the next. But James 
would have been surprised at how quickly some of us agree with him. He doesn’t think the 
stream metaphor just obviously applies; he thinks that the claim that the metaphor applies is 
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a substantive philosophical conclusion. This is a fact that is missed by readers like Aron 
Gurwitsch, who say that for James the interconnectedness of conscious states is something 
so obvious for James that it “need not be established” (Gurwitsch 1943 p. 449).  
For James, there are two ways that consciousness can seem to have a breach or a gap 
that might worry us – gaps in time, and gaps in content. First, there are time gaps of 
unconsciousness in our lives. But he says that after a state of unconsciousness,  what makes 
the moments before and after the state feel like they belong to the same stream of 
consciousness is that they feel like they belong to the same self (James 1890 p. 239). 
Secondly, this is how he describes the worry about gaps in content: “Does not a loud 
explosion rend the consciousness upon which it abruptly breaks, in twain? Does not every 
sudden shock, appearance of a new object, or change in a sensation, create a real 
interruption, sensibly felt as such, which cuts the conscious stream across at the moment at 
which it appears? Do not such interruptions smite us every hour of our lives, and have we 
the right, in their presence, still to call our consciousness a continuous stream?” (James 1890 
pp. 239-40) 
 James goes on to defuse the second worry through arguing that closer introspective 
observation will reveal that no change in the stream of consciousness is truly, totally abrupt. 
In his view, every two sequential moments of consciousness are somewhat 
phenomenologically alike, with the feelings in the first moment leaving at least some 
experiential traces in the feelings that are present in the second moment. This is how James 
thinks this style of reply applies to his objection about thunder: “… [into] the awareness of 
the thunder itself the awareness of the previous silence creeps and continues; for what we 
hear when the thunder crashes is not thunder pure, buts thunder-breaking-upon-silence-
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and-contrasting-with-it” (James 1890 p. 240). There would be a true breach in consciousness 
if the feeling silence was totally eradicated at the moment of thunder, but because traces of 
silence remain, there is no true breach.  
James thinks this sort of moment-to-moment colouring, overlapping, or similarity is 
ubiquitous in consciousness.  Here is one example of how he describes the phenomenon as 
it shows up during reading: “If we read 'no more' we expect presently to come upon a 'than'; 
if we read 'however' at the outset of a sentence it is a 'yet,' a 'still,' or a 'nevertheless,' that 
we expect… And this foreboding of the coming grammatical scheme combined with each 
successive uttered word is so practically accurate that a reader incapable of understanding 
four ideas of the book he is reading aloud, can nevertheless read it with the most delicately 
modulated expression of intelligence” (James 1890 p. 254).  
So James rejects skepticism about the stream metaphor for consciousness through 
emphasizing his view about what it is for thought to be “sensibly continuous”. It is for any 
two moments in thought to overlap at least slightly in their phenomenology - for the feeling 
of silence to remain, at least somewhat, in the moment in which the feeling of thunder that 
follows begins, or for the feeling of “no more” to remain, at least somewhat, when the feeling 
of the word “than” arrives.  
Moreover, James believes that in examining these two types of apparent discontinuity 
his defense of the stream metaphor has been exhaustive. As he writes before embarking on 
the defense of the metaphor, these two kinds of breaches in the stream of consciousness are 
“… [the] only breaches that can well be conceived to occur within the limits of a single mind” 
(James 1890 p. 237, emphasis mine). As I’ll go on to argue in the next section of the paper, 
James’s defense is sufficient to deal with the challenges raised by the phenomenology and 
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neuroscience of binocular rivalry, but reading Buddhaghosa’s work shows us that there may 
be a third way for consciousness to fail to flow, a way that James did not consider. 
3. Binocular Rivalry and Flow 
In Waking, Dreaming, Being, after Thompson reviews some literature on binocular 
rivalry, he raises the following provocative question: “But is the flow of conscious perception 
really discrete, like the frames of a movie or a series of snapshots? Maybe this way of thinking 
about perception comes from relying too much on the unusual situation of binocular rivalry” 
(Thompson 2014 p. 34). In so doing, he is saying that binocular rivalry is a phenomenon 
which poses at least some counterexamples to the view that moments of consciousness 
always flow into one another – perhaps because of the phenomenology of binocular rivalry, 
perhaps because of what the neuroscientific study of binocular rivalry reveals about what 
goes on our brains during binocular rivalry. I’ll argue that neither of these conclusions is the 
case. As long as we keep in mind James’s view of what is actually required for one moment 
of consciousness to flow into another, we can see that neither the phenomenology nor 
neuroscience of binocular rivalry poses a challenge to the idea that there is a stream of 
consciousness.  
In binocular rivalry experiments, participants simultaneously view two images. One 
image is exposed only to the left eye, and one image is exposed only to the right eye. In visual 
consciousness, participants don’t see both images at once. Instead, their experience 
alternates from an experience of one image to an experience the other image (Thompson 
2014 p. 22). With the basic methodology in view, we can consider this question: “In binocular 
rivalry experiments, from the subject’s perspective, does consciousness seem to fail to flow?” 
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What might motivate a “yes” answer to this question is the fact that from moment to moment 
in these experiments, what is presented in the stream of consciousness can be dramatically 
different. A checkerboard may seem to suddenly change into a face, or a selection of maple 
leaves may seem to suddenly change into a butterfly, to mention two of Thompson’s specific 
examples (Thompson 2014 p. 29, p. 33). 
But this line of thought is structurally identical to James’s suggestion that thunder 
breaking upon silence challenges the “stream” metaphor, and it can be answered in a 
structurally identical way. As long as there is some trace of the previous moment’s 
experience in the present moment, then the sensible continuity of consciousness has been 
maintained. And if we look at subjects reporting on the phenomenology of binocular rivalry, 
it seems as though some of these traces persist.  
For instance, of his own experience, Thompson writes:  
The two images I’m viewing are a photograph of a woman’s face and 
an expanding ring with a checkerboard pattern. A special setup keeps 
the two images separate by projecting the face to my right eye and the 
expanding checkerboard ring to my left eye. As I stare at the screen, 
the checkerboard ring starts to give way and change into the woman’s 
face. The face breaks through in disconnected patches, which merge 
and take over the whole screen. A few seconds later, the face falls apart 
and the expanding checkerboard rings return, removing the face 
completely (Thompson 2014 p. 21). 
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Part of what it is to have the experience gradually change from a checkerboard to a face is 
for some traces of the complete checkerboard experience to remain in the various stages of 
experience as the checkerboard changes to the face. These traces are what explain the feeling 
that something is changing before one’s eyes. And even if there weren’t these gradual 
changes – even if the face changed completely abruptly into the checkerboard – there would 
still be a felt difference between seeing a checkerboard that was a moment ago a face and 
seeing a checkerboard that was a moment ago a checkerboard. Experiential traces of the 
previous images are what explains this fact.  
 Not to mention that we can make use of a resource to which James doesn’t consider 
in his analysis of thunder breaking upon silence – elements of the stream of consciousness 
outside of the dramatic change under consideration. Even if the switch from the 
checkerboard to the face is abrupt, part of what makes consciousness seem to flow from one 
moment to the next is that so much more stays constant in consciousness: the subject’s 
auditory experiences of the quiet room that they are in; the subject’s experiences of their 
own body, the subject’s experience of their internal monologue, and so on. So at the level of 
phenomenological description, there is nothing about binocular rivalry that challenges 
James’s thesis that every moment in the stream of consciousness is sensibly continuous with 
the next.3  
 
3 In this section of the paper I have argued that binocular rivalry does not pose a special challenge for James’s 
analysis of flow, because his analysis seems to apply to it as well as his analysis applies to any of the cases he 
considered explicitly in Principles of Psychology. But are either of James’s analyses of flow - in terms of 
overlapping contents or feelings of belonging to the same self – actually accurate analyses of the phenomenon 
of flow? Can we find reason to doubt his introspective descriptions of flow? These are interesting questions 
that are outside the scope of the present investigation. 
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But perhaps Thompson thinks that something about the neuroscience of what goes 
on during binocular rivalry challenges the view that consciousness flows.  I’ll argue that 
while the neuroscience doesn’t teach us anything about conscious flow, it does teach us about 
another aspect of consciousness – how quickly it can change in terms of what it presents to 
a subject.  
We can see this through looking to one of the studies that Thompson cites as relevant 
to the issue of conscious flow - Doesburg et al. 2009 (cited at Thompson 2014 p. 32). In the 
study, participants pressed a button to indicate when their experience shifted from one 
image to another image (in the context of binocular rivalry). Doesburg et al. used EEG with 
an aim to understanding what was going on in the brain when the image shifted from one 
image to another, from the perspective of a participant. Here is what they say relationship 
between their observations and conscious flow: 
We found that the recurrent gamma-oscillatory network identified in 
this study was modulated at a theta frequency, consistent with 
previous studies of endogenous oscillatory synchronization time-
locked to perceptual switching in binocular rivalry. This supports the 
hypothesis that theta-modulated gamma-band synchronizations are 
essentially related to perceptual experience and define discrete 
‘frames’ of consciousness, consistent with results from attentional 
blink experiments and those investigating coherent perception of 
visual images. The distribution of dominance durations in our study, 
consistent with findings from previous studies, suggests that 
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perceptual switching did not occur on every theta cycle. This indicates 
that the theta cycle determines when a new perceptual experience can 
occur, but that the content of each ‘frame’ of consciousness does not 
need to differ from that of its predecessor…  
Although discrete moments of perception can only occur at a certain 
rate, as demonstrated by the attentional blink phenomenon, 
subjective consciousness is seamless and continuous rather than 
presenting itself as a sequence of discrete conscious moments. The 
results presented here suggest a similar arrangement, as perceptual 
consciousness is updated by a periodic mechanism but is experienced 
as a continuous and stream of consciousness (Doesburg et al 2009 p. 
9). 
As this passage makes clear, what Doesburg et al. have really supported is the claim is that 
there is a certain rhythm at which the contents of consciousness can change (here I use 
“contents of consciousness” just to mean “what consciousness seems to present to a 
subject”). It’s not the case that every passing millisecond or nanosecond presents an 
opportunity for the contents of consciousness to change; instead the rhythms that these 
neuroscientists are studying seem to give us a more accurate sense of when the contents of 
consciousness can change. This is an interesting result. Perhaps folk psychology tells us that 
consciousness is more sensitive and changeable than this. If so, we should use result like this 
one to temper our misplaced confidence in the high sensitivity and changeability of the 
stream of consciousness.  
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Doesburg et al.  also say that this finding is in tension with the view that consciousness 
is a continuous and steady stream, and this is where they make a mistake. All that is required 
for flow is for the phenomenology of sequential moments of consciousness to overlap at least 
some degree, and this is compatible with whatever the facts are about the rate of change of 
contents presented to us via the stream of consciousness. What this study actually supports 
is a conclusion about the rhythm at which the contents of consciousness can change.   
At this point, one might raise the worry that nothing at all could falsify James’s view 
about conscious flow. But this worry would be misplaced. James says that immediately 
sequential moments of consciousness always feel overlap slightly in their phenomenology, 
and that moments of consciousness that are divided by a span of unconsciousness still feel 
like they belong to the same self. But if consciousness doesn’t always feel one of these two 
ways, then James’s claim that consciousness always feels sensibly continuous would be 
mistaken. Perhaps there are experiences he did not consider that falsify his universal claim, 
or perhaps he did not have sufficient training to describe his experiences accurately, or 
perhaps he misdescribed his experiences because of some sort of theoretical bias. If any of 
these possibilities are the case, then James would wrong about conscious flow. As we’ll see 
in the next section of the paper, we can use materials from Buddhaghosa’s work to build a 
criticism along these lines.  
4. Abhidharma and Flow  
Here is where Thompson identifies a disagreement between James and 
some Abhidharma philosophers on conscious flow: 
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The Abhidharma philosophers agree that the mental stream is always 
changing, but they argue that it appears to flow continuously only to 
the untrained observer. A deeper examination indicates that the 
stream of consciousness is made up of discontinuous and discrete 
moments of awareness. Whether the Abhidharma philosophers 
arrived at this view through inner observation or through logical 
analysis premised on an atomistic view of the mind, or some com- 
bination of both, is a matter of scholarly debate. In any case, they 
believed that discrete moments of awareness or “mind moments” can 
be identified, described, and catalogued; moreover, their duration is 
said to be measurable (Thompson 2014 p. 35). 
Consider the inference at work in the passage above: if it turns out that consciousness is 
actually made of “discontinuous and discrete moments of awareness”, then James’s stream 
metaphor is inaccurate. Consciousness seems to flow but in reality, it does not. Whether this 
inference is correct, and whether it represents an objection to James grounded in the work 
of Abhidharma philosophers, depends on just how we interpret “discontinuous and discrete 
moments of awareness”. 
If what we mean by “discontinuous and discrete moments awareness” is something 
like “moments which exist very briefly and are metaphysically independent of each other” 
then the inference does not make sense as an objection to the view that consciousness flows. 
This is certainly a claim that we can find in the Abhidharma and Buddhist philosophy more 
broadly: see von Rospatt 1995 for discussion. But claim does not make sense as an objection 
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to James because James’s claim about flow is a claim about phenomenology, namely the claim 
that the phenomenology of any two sequential moments of consciousness will always 
overlap to a certain extent, or the claim that any two moments will feel like they belong to 
the same self. The claim is not about the metaphysical priority of any particular temporal 
unit of experience. Even if every moment of experience is brief and metaphysically 
independent of all the other moments of experience, these moments could fail to feel as 
though they are brief and independent of each other. It’s possible that they could feel a way 
that coheres entirely with James’s description of the stream of consciousness. 
So, if Thompson’s inference above offers up a good objection to James, we need 
evidence that there are moments in streams of consciousness that actually feel 
discontinuous from each other. And if this truly is an objection to be found in Abhidharma 
philosophy, what we also need is textual evidence that this phenomenological judgment can 
be found somewhere in in the works of Abhidharma philosophers.  
There is evidence in favour of both of these points, but the evidence is less 
straightforward than Thompson suggests. Looking at this evidence allows us to see that 
Thompson misdescribes the nature of the disagreement between James and Abhidharma 
philosophers. The evidence that I draw on comes from Buddhaghosa’s Visuddhimagga (The 
Path of Purification), in particular. In Visuddhimagga we do not find an observation which 
simply clashes with James’s analysis of conscious flow. Specifically, we do not find the claim 
that that sometimes, two immediately sequential moments of consciousness are so radically 
different in content that there is a real breach between them, which is James’s account of 
how consciousness flows in most ordinary, day-to-day experience. What we find instead is a 
rejection of James’s second sense of flow, which James proposed to deal with the special case 
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of flow that obtains across moments of unconsciousness. And even more interestingly, what 
we find is the suggestion that there is a third way for consciousness to fail to flow. I’ll discuss 
these points in turn, focusing more on the latter point.  
James’s second sense of flow refers to a sense of self: he says that when the stream of 
consciousness stretches across a period of unconsciousness, flow still obtains because the 
states before and after the gap feel like they belong to the same self. In the Abhidharma and 
in Buddhist philosophy more broadly we can frequently find a rejection of the claim that the 
self, as normally construed, exists (see, e.g. Albahari 2006). This is a metaphysical thesis that 
is not directly in tension with James’s second analysis of flow, which is a phenomenological 
claim. 
But this metaphysical thesis also sometimes comes along with a phenomenological 
claim does genuinely challenge James’s second analysis of flow. For instance, in 
Buddhaghosa’s Visuddhimagga, we can find the claim that we can “liberate” ourselves from 
perceiving anything at all as our self after engaging in the right kind of contemplative 
practices. He writes that the meditator “delivers, liberates the mind… from the perception of 
self by means of the contemplation of not self…” Buddhaghosa (2010 p. 282 / VIII.233). And 
if this is possible for some subjects, then their streams of consciousness will fail to flow in 
James’s second sense: at least sometimes, they will not feel as though multiple moments of 
consciousness that are separated by a period of unconsciousness belong to the same self. 
Before going on to consider the third sense in which consciousness can be 
discontinuous, we can consider the following question, which challenges the line of thought 
above. Is my claim that according to Buddhaghosa we can learn experience two subsequent 
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moments as failing to belong to the same self actually incompatible with what Buddhaghosa 
says about a mental state called bhavaṅga (Buddhaghosa 2010 p. 458 / XIV.114)?  
On Jonardon Ganeri’s reading, bhavaṅga have an intentional content “roughly 
consisting in autobiographic semantic information” (2017 p. 46). On Rupert Gethin’s 
reading, “a being’s bhavaṅga itself represents a kind of summing up of what he or she did in 
his or her previous life; in crude terms, it represents a kind of balance sheet carried over 
from the previous life detailing how one did” (2005 p. 167). If these readings are correct, 
then bhavaṅga could be, at least sometimes, a part of the causal explanation of why some 
subjects experience sequential moments of consciousness as belonging to the same self. But 
my reading of Buddhaghosa is consistent with such a possibility. In my view, Buddhaghosa 
would say that while bhavaṅga might be a part of the causal explanation of why some 
ordinary, untrained subjects experience sequential moments of consciousness as belonging 
to the same self, part of the purpose of the meditative practices he describes Visuddhimagga 
is to train subjects to respond differently to bhavaṅga, and more broadly, to respond 
differently to everything in the world, in a way that causes them to abandon the perception 
of self in all things (Buddhaghosa 2010 p. 282 / VIII.233; p. 632 / XX.4; p. 655 / XX.90).  
Secondly, and even more interestingly, in Visuddhimagga we can find the claim that 
the stream of consciousness can feel discontinuous because we can feel each moment of 
consciousness pass out of and into existence; that consciousness, like all things, appears to 
us “perpetually renewed” (Buddhaghosa 2010 pp. 657 / XX.104; 1 See Gethin 2004 p. 216 for 
more on this particular passage, as well as my references to Buddhaghosa immediately 
below). This is a kind of felt discontinuity which is compatible with moments in the stream 
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of consciousness overlapping in content and with moments in the stream of consciousness 
feeling like they belong to the same self. It is a third kind of discontinuity that James did not 
consider in his analysis of how consciousness might fail to flow. 
In these passages, Buddhaghosa describes a meditator who has first engaged in all 
the contemplative practices described earlier in Visuddhimagga going through a (roughly) 
three step process which enables her to experience all things as impermanent, and 
moreover, as constantly destroyed and renewed. The first step is reflecting on the 
impermanence of materiality and as a result becoming able to experience materiality as 
impermanent. The second step is reflecting on the impermanence of consciousness and as a 
result becoming able to experience consciousness as impermanent. The third step is 
reflecting on the apparent constant creation and destruction of impermanent things, and as 
a result becoming able to experience all impermanent things as constantly being created, 
destroyed, and renewed.  
One of Buddhaghosa’s suggested strategies for achieving the experience of 
materiality as impermanent is to reflect on how the materiality that shows up in various 
temporal subdivisions of a body’s life all seem like impermanent materiality. For instance, 
Buddhaghosa suggests that the meditator think of a body’s life divided into three equal 
temporal spans, and noticing that nothing of the materiality from the first third of the life 
persists in the second third of the life, the meditator should attribute impermanence to the 
materiality from the first third of the life (Buddhaghosa 2010 pp. 645-646 / XX.47-49). He 
suggests that the meditator continue to carry out this procedure with narrower and 
narrower time-slices of a body’s life (e.g. the first “tender decade”, the second “sport decade”, 
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and so on) (Buddhaghosa 2010 pp. 646 / XX.51). He also recommends that the meditator 
carry out an analogous procedure with the materiality that occurs in many other temporal 
spans, like the span of a year or a season, and that as a result she will thereby eventually gain 
the ability to perceive the impermanence in materiality (Buddhaghosa 2010 pp. 647 / XX.56-
57).4 
After engaging in this process, Buddhaghosa says that the meditator can turn her 
conscious thinking upon the very consciousness with which she was thinking about the 
impermanence of materiality. He says that the meditator should be able to experience this 
consciousness that was directed at materiality as impermanent, as well (Buddhaghosa 2010 
pp. 652 / XX.79). Moreover, he suggests that this process should be able occur recursively, 
that is, that the meditator should be able to experience her conscious thinking about her 
conscious thinking about the impermanence of materiality as impermanent, and so on. 
(Buddhaghosa 2010 pp. 653 / XX.80-81).  
After a meditator has engaged in both sets of contemplative exercises that are focused 
on the developing the capacity to experience the impermanence of material things and of 
consciousness, Buddhaghosa says that she is in a position to contemplate change in 
impermanent things, which he asserts is equivalent to contemplating their constant 
apparent “rise and fall”, that is, their constant apparent creation and destruction 
(Buddhaghosa 2010 pp. 657 / XX.93-95). The meditator is directed to compare all things to 
the sound of a lute, which doesn’t come from any “store” before it arises or go to any “store” 
 
4 It’s important to note that Buddhaghosa is not saying that this process is sufficient for gaining the capacity 
to perceive impermanence in things, but rather that it’s a necessary part of the process – fully describing the 
process would require a more complete exposition of Visuddhimagga. 
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after it falls (Buddhaghosa 2010 pp. 657 / XX.96). And after this final contemplative exercise, 
all things “… appear to [the meditator] as perpetually renewed” (Buddhaghosa 2010 pp. 657 
/ XX.104).5  
Expanding on this idea with a set of similes, Buddhaghosa writes: “… they are not only 
perpetually renewed, but they are also short-lived like dew-drops at sunrise, like a bubble 
on water, like a line drawn on water, like a mustard seed on an awl's point, like a lightning 
flash” (Buddhaghosa 2010 pp. 657 / XX.104). And if we really can experience consciousness 
in this way – always being created and destroyed -  then Buddhaghosa has identified a real 
sense in which there can we can notice breaches in the stream of consciousness.6 In James’s 
language, the constant apparent destruction and renewal of consciousness could be a way 
that consciousness does manage to “… appear to itself chopped up in bits” (James 1890 p. 
239).  
We can see some additional evidence for the idea that Buddhaghosa describes a third 
way in which consciousness might fail to flow in his analysis of the citta-vīthi, or cognitive 
series, and in his description of how we can put our knowledge of the citta-vīthi to use during 
meditative practice. On Ganeri’s reading of Buddhaghosa, the cognitive series is a sequence 
of cognitive states that occurs as the mind “oscillates” between taking up a task and 
occupying its resting state (Ganeri 2017 pp. 42-47). What Ganeri calls the resting state of the 
mind is a state that Buddhaghosa calls bhavaṅga, which he says, “goes on occurring 
 
5 Not just material things and consciousness – here I interpret the use of “formations” in the sense of “all 
conditioned things”. See Bodhi (2000 p. 46) for this broadest use of the term.  
6 See Davis (2018) for further discussion of some of these passages from Visuddhimagga and related 
phenomenological testimony from Mahasi Sayadaw. For work on Buddhaghosa’s views more broadly, see 
Heim (2013) and Ganeri (2017). 
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endlessly, in periods of dreamless sleep, etc., like the current of a river.” (Buddhaghosa 2010 
p. 458 / XIV.114). When we are interrupted from this resting state, a series of cognitive 
events, the citta-vīthi,  eventually culminates in consciousness of some sort, which persists 
briefly, and then lapses back into bhavaṅga.  
In the case of visual consciousness, the cognitive series begins with a stimulus 
impinging the eye, which, if strong enough, will “disturb” bhavaṅga (Buddhaghosa 2010 p. 
463 / XIV 115). After this initial disturbance, there will be a sequence of cognitive events that 
Buddhaghosa says perform functions including “adverting”, “receiving”, “investigating”, 
“determining”, “impulsion”, and “registration” (Buddhaghosa 2010 p. 463 / XIV 114 – 124; 
see also Buddhaghosa 2010 p. 24 / I.57). On Ganeri’s reading, “registration” corresponds to 
“having an object consciously in view” (Ganeri 2017 p. 58). More generally,  on Ganeri’s 
reading, all the steps of the cognitive series are performed by mental modules that are 
analogous to systems identified in contemporary cognitive science, e.g. the “early, middle, 
and late visual subsystems” (Ganeri 2017 p. 200). 
Buddhaghosa draws on our knowledge of the cognitive series, as described above,  in 
one of his descriptions of how a meditator can come to experience consciousness as 
impermanent. To put that idea into conversation with James, Buddhaghosa draws on our 
knowledge of the cognitive series in order to help explain how we can learn to experience a 
failure to flow in consciousness.  In this part of the text, Buddhaghosa says that a meditator 
should reflect on how both material things and consciousness are generated, and that as a 
result of focusing on their generation, she will come to more deeply understand that they 
both are things that pass out of existence (Buddhaghosa 2010 pp. 639-645 / XX.22-45). In 
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his discussion of reflecting on the generation of consciousness in particular (as opposed to 
the generation of materiality), Buddhaghosa explicitly invokes the cognitive series as it is 
defined earlier in the text. He says that the mediator should reflect on how each stage of the 
cognitive series leads to the generation of consciousness, and that as a result the meditator 
will more deeply understand that consciousness is impermanent (Buddhaghosa 2010 p. 644 
/ XX.44-45, p. 644 fn. 18).  
This is one of the ways in which we can contemplate impermanence. And according 
to Buddhaghosa, contemplating impermanence in things is a part of what enables us to really 
experience them as impermanent (Buddhaghosa 2010 pp. 632 / XX.4). So in his view, the 
meditator’s theoretical knowledge about the cognitive series can be put to practical use in a 
contemplative exercise that will help enable the meditator to learn to experience 
consciousness as impermanent. Again, this is a way that Buddhaghosa believes that the right 
meditative practice can lead us to have experiences in which “consciousness appears to itself 
chopped into bits” (James 1890 p. 239). 
This is why Buddhaghosa is best interpreted as challenging the way James 
understands his thesis about flow rather than merely as saying that James’s thesis is false. 
To miss out on this fact is to underestimate the contribution Buddhaghosa  makes to this 
discussion. He does not simply defend one option in logical space and disagree with James. 
Instead, he contends that James has misrepresented logical space, and that the correct view 




James claimed that consciousness does not feel like it is chopped into bits. Nothing in 
the contemporary study of binocular rivalry or the neural correlates of experiences that 
occur during binocular rivalry challenge this thesis. Instead, what that phenomenon reveals 
is the degree to which the stream of consciousness is sensitive, and thereby able to rapidly 
change in felt character. By contrast, Buddhaghosa does make a genuine challenge to James’s 
thesis. But understanding his challenge requires understanding that James analysed flow in 
two ways, and that Buddhaghosa emphasized a third kind of flow of which James was 
unaware.  
Taking James and Buddhaghosa’s claims collectively, this paper has presented three 
ways in which to analyse the phenomenon of conscious flow. James suggested that sequential 
moments of consciousness feel like they flow because they overlap in contents or belong to 
the same self. Buddhaghosa suggested that moments of consciousness can feel like they fail 
to flow because they feel perpetually renewed. But can we find reasons to doubt the accuracy 
their introspective reports? Or are there other ways that consciousness can flow or fail to 
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